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Kleppinger: Evidence - Abrogating the Cautionary Instruction in Criminal Pros

EVIDENCE-Abrogating the Cautionary Instruction in Criminal Prosecutions
Relying Substantially on Circumstantial Evidence. Blakeley v. State, 542
P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1975).

The general rule that whatever may be established by
direct or testimonial evidence in a criminal case may also
be established by indirect or circumstantial evidence has
achieved nearly universal recognition in American courts.1
The rule is founded upon principles of necessity. Crimes frequently occur in areas where no observers are present, and
the difficulty encounterd in obtaining a confession from an
accused often leaves circumstantial evidence as the sole
mechanism by which a conviction may be obtained. 2 Substanial disagreement has surfaced on the issue of how to
instruct the jury in terms of circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable doubt standard, the goal being to protect the
criminally accused from jury speculation and conjecture.'
The disagreement centers upon the necessity for a "cautionary instruction" regarding indirect or circumstantial
evidence.4
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court held in
Holland v. United States5 that in criminal prosecutions relying substantially on circumstantial evidence the jury instructions should equate the probative value of circumstantial
evidence with that of direct evidence.' Courts adopting the
Holland doctrine have generally expressed concern as to the
unrestricted application of the rule and to that end have
adopted safeguard instructions to protect the accused.'
Copyright@ 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1. Brumley v. State, 96 Okl. Cr. 91, 249 P.2d 471, 473 (1952); Corbett v.
People, 153 Colo. 457, 38'7 P.2d 409, 411, cert. denied 377 U.S. 939 (1963).
See 1 WIGMORn, EVIDENCE §§ 24-25, at 396-401 (3d. ed. 1970), equating the
probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence.
2. Corbett v. People, supra note 1, at 411.
3. Dill v. State, 437 P.2d 459, 461 (Old. Cr. 1968).
4. In a number of courts, it is held that in a criminal case where conviction
must rest substantially on circumstantial evidence the court must instruct
the jury that the proven facts and circumstances must not only be consistent
with the theory of guilt but also must be inconsistent with any other
rational conclusion. See State v. Davis, 69 Idaho 270, 206 P.2d 271, 274
(1949); Brumley v. State, supra note 1, at 473; People v. Kolb, 174 C.A.2d
102, 344 P.2d 316, 319 (1959). The instruction is properly termed a "cautionary" instruction. State v. Norton, 17 Ore. 296, 133 P.2d 252, 262 (1943).
5. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
6. Id. at 140.
7. Within this Note four instructions will be discussed in terms of practice
under Holland u. United States. For purposes of clarity, the instructions
are briefly explained at this point:
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Blakeley v. State
Howard Blakeley was charged with feloniously misbranding livestock, in violation of Section 11-564 of the Wyoming
Statutes.' Upon trial Blakeley was found guilty by a jury
and sentenced. The conviction was founded substantially
upon circumstantial evidence.'
Defendant charged three errors of the trial court on
appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, two of which are
material to the discussion in this Note: (1) the trial court
erred in refusing to give defendant's instruction cautioning
the jury not to utilize evidence giving rise to mere suspicion
or conjecture; and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to
include with the cautionary instruction on circumstantial
evidence the words "to the exclusion of all others".1"
a. The "burden of proof instruction": this instruction is uniformly given
in criminal cases. The instruction merely informs the jury as to legal
presumptions and as to the party upon whom falls the burden of proving
certain facts in the case.
b. The "reasonable doubt" instruction: this instruction is used to guide the
jury in its evaluation of the evidence produced at trial. The instruction
indicates the standard of proof under which a conviction may be returned.
This instruction is either given by a full, definitional explanation of the
term "reasonable doubt", or by merely establishing the standard without
elaboration on its meaning.
c. The "cautionary instruction" regarding circumstantial evidence: typical
of this instruction is the one used by the trial court in the principal case:
In this case the State is relying solely on circumstantial evidence
and you are instructed it is a well-established rule of law that,
where circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon, the circumstances when considered together must point clearly and conclusively to the guilt of Howard Blakeley and exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt.
Blakeley v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1975).
d. The Holland instruction: on the basis of Holland v. United States, supra
note 5, a number of courts now use an instruction similar to the following:
There are two types of evidence from which you may find the
truth as to the facts of a case--direct and circumstantial eviCircumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts
dence ....
and circumstances indicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be
given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a
greater degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence
than of direct evidence. . . . After weighing all the evidence,
if you are not convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find him not guilty.
1 DEVIr AND BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 11.02 (Supp. 1975).
8. Wyo. STAT. § 11-564 (Supp. 1975).
9. Although the Wyoming court does not indicate substantial reliance on
circumstantial evidence explicitly, the conclusion is inferred from the
court's treatment of the defendant's assignments of error. Blakeley v.
State, supra note 7, at 861.
10. The trial court gave the instruction regarding circumstantial evidence
quoted in paragraph c of note 7, supra.
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The Wyoming court affirmed the conviction, indicating
that the instruction regarding circumstantial evidence was
consistent with prior standards established by the court.
However, the court further held that in a criminal case the
cautionary instruction regarding circumstantial evidence is
unnecessary, tends to confuse the jury, and is no longer to
be used in Wyoming, thereby overruling a long series of
Wyoming cases sanctioning the instruction."
THE Blakeley COURT'S REASONING
The court had very little difficulty in affirming the
conviction on the basis of the traditional treatment of circumstantial evidence in Wyoming. As for the circumstantial
evidence instruction given by the trial court, the Wyoming
court held the language to be consistent with the holding of
Mulligan v. State.2 The court indicated that the proposed
instruction warning the jury against using evidence giving
rise to suspicion or conjecture would have been an attempt
to define reasonable doubt, a practice prohibited by Cosco v.
State." The court also found that an instruction imploring
the jury to "exclude all reasonable doubt of the Defendant"' 4
adequately barred the jury from suspicion and conjecture."5
The pivotal reasoning of the opinion concerns the court's
repudiation of Mulligan and earlier decisions sanctioning the
use of the cautionary instruction regarding circumstantial
evidence. Without hearing arguments on the issue, the
majority adopted a rule that is gaining popularity in both
federal and state courts. Relying on the Holland rule, the
court held that a cautionary instruction regarding circumstantial evidence is not to be given where a proper instruction
on reasonable doubt is utilized.'
11. Id. at 863. In a vigorous dissent, McClintock, J., indicated that no argument was heard by the court as to the need for repudiating prior Wyoming
decisions concerning the circumstantial evidence instruction. Id. at 867
(McClintock, J., dissenting).
12. 513 P.2d 180, 181 (Wyo. 1973). Mulligan and the treatment of circumstantial evidence in a narcotics prosecution are discussed in Note, Can You
Be Busted For Your Roomaate's Pot? 9 LAND & WATER L. REv. 237 (1974).
13. 521 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Wyo. 1974).
14. See the reasonable doubt instruction discussed supra note 7.
15. Blakeley v. State, supra note 7, at 861.
16. Id. at 862.
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Holding that circumstantial evidence must not be
measured upon a different basis than direct evidence, the
court reasoned that circumstantial evidence must not be
given inferior status in a criminal prosecution. 7 Inferentially
the court indicates that the cautionary instruction tends to
unnecessarily isolate circumstantial evidence with the result
that such evidence is relegated to an inferior evidential status.
The theoretical basis for the new Wyoming rule is that
it is the function of the reasonable doubt instruction to define
the parameters by which evidence, both circumstantial and
direct, is to be evaluated by the jury. 8 The conclusion of the
court was that the reasonable doubt instruction makes the
cautionary instruction on circumstantial evidence unnecessary and, furthermore, giving'only the former tends to mitigate much jury confusion in the evaluation of circumstantial
evidence. Expressly overruling the inconsistent position
taken in Mulligan, the Wyoming court sanctioned the federal
pattern instruction that embodies the Holland rule.'
PRE-Blakeley TREATMENT OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Prior to the Blakeley decision Wyoming courts, operating under the proposition that in a criminal prosecution evidence creating a mere probability of guilt is insufficient to
sustain a conviction,"0 uniformly held that proof of a criminal
charge by circumstantial evidence must be consistent with
any theory of the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any
other reasonable conclusion. 2 '
The acceptance of circumstantial evidence in Wyoming
was reflected in a series of standard instructions that were
given regarding such evidence. Three instructions were utilized as the burden of proof instruction, and the instruction
setting forth the reasonable doubt standard was augmented
by an instruction indicating that circumstantial evidence
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 861-62.
Id. at 861.
See the Holland instruction, supra note 7.
State v. Rideout, 450 P.2d 452, 454-55 (Wyo. 1969).
Mulligan v. State, supra note 12, at 181.
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must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.22 It was held to be reversible error for the trial
court to refuse the cautionary instruction when a prosecution
was founded wholly or substantially on circumstantial
evidence."5
Use of all three instructions prior to Blakeley was
internally consistent. The burden of proof instruction served
to indicate to the jury what presumptions were to be considered during deliberation. The reasonable doubt instruction
served to guide the jury's evaluation of the evidence. This
instruction, however, was severely proscribed by Cosco, holding that the term "reasonable doubt" is self-explanatory and
that any attempt to elaborate on the meaning of the term
is likely to produce jury confusion, resulting in reversible
error. 4 Cosco, in effect, prohibited the trial court from giving
a "definitional" instruction as to the meaning of reasonable
doubt. Finally, the cautionary instruction on circumstantial
evidence served to protect the accused from jury speculation,
in effect supplementing the reasonable doubt instruction.
The pre-Blakeley treatment of circumstantial evidence and
instructions regarding such evidence was consistent with the
practice of a majority of the state courts.25
Holland v. United States
In the past two decades a number of state courts and
all federal courts have abandoned the pre-Blakeley practice
of instructing the jury with regard to circumstantial evidence
under the doctrinal justification of Holland v. United States.
The essence of the Holland doctrine is that the probative value
of direct and circumstantial evidence is not to be distinguished. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court held that
22. Gardner v. State, 27 Wyo. 316, 196 P. 750, 751 (1921); Mares v. State, 500
P.2d 530, 538 (Wyo. 1972).
23. Thompson v. State, 41 Wyo. 72, 283 P. 151, 167 (1929); State v. Paulas,
74 Wyo. 269, 286 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1955) ; Ballinger v. State, 437 P.2d 305,
309 (Wyo. 1968).
24. Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203, 206 (Wyo. 1972); Cosco v. State, supra note
13, at 1846.
25. State v. Norton, supra note 4, at 262; People v. Kolb, supra note 4, at 319;
Dill v. State, supra note 3, at 461.
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when an adequate instruction on reasonable doubt is given, 6
the cautionary instruction on circumstantial evidence must
be abandoned. The presumption underlying the Holland doctrine is that an adequate instruction on reasonable doubt
fulfills the function of the cautionary instruction and results
in much less jury confusion in evaluating direct and circumstantial evidence. 7
The Holland Court specifically approved the use of three
instructions. The burden of proof instruction is used to
fulfill the same policy as it promoted in the pre-Blakeley era
in Wyoming. The Court approved a reasonable doubt instruction that not only set the standard of evaluation for purposes
of conviction, but also
elaborated on the meaning of the term
"reasonable doubt".2 8 The function of this instruction was
both to guide the jury's evaluation of the evidence and to
provide an insight into the meaning of the standard, the goal
being to limit jury speculation.2" Finally, the Court provided
the groundwork for an instruction specifically equating the
probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence."0 The
function of this new Holland instruction was to ensure that
circumstantial evidence was not relegated to an inferior
status.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE UNDER

Blakeley

By way of Blakeley v. State the Wyoming court has
adopted the Holland doctrine and, thus, has abandoned the
use of the cautionary instruction regarding circumstantial
evidence. The impact of Wyoming's adoption of Holland can
best be found by way of examination of how other jurisdictions practice under Holland.
A jurisdiction adopting the Holland doctrine ought to
heed the Supreme Court's expressed concern for the unre26. Elaboration of what will suffice as an "adequate instruction on reasonable
doubt" has caused substantial disagreement among the courts. See cases
cited note 33 in/ra.
27. Holland v. Uuited States, supra note 5, at 140.
28. Id. at 140. The reasonable doubt instruction was as follows: ...
the kind
of doubt . . . which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of
your own lives might be willing to act upon."
29. Id. at 140.
30. See the Holland instruction, supra note 7.
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stricted application of the Holland rule. The Court recognized that the dangers inherent in criminal prosecutions
founded solely on circumstantial evidence are not to be lightly
considered." The Court suggested a number of safeguard
instructions to be used in conjunction with the Holland instruction as alternatives to the cautionary instruction." The
practice of other jurisdictions that have adopted Holland is
essentially a function of how these safeguards are utilized
at the trial level.
One practice under the Holland standard allows full
definitional explanation of the reasonable doubt standard.
State courts practicing under Holland have expressed nearly
universal concern as to the adequacy of the reasonable doubt
instruction which is used to replace the cautionary instruction on circumstantial evidence.' Upon abrogating the cautionary instruction, both federal and state courts have been
very careful to ensure that the reasonable doubt standard
is fully developed within the context of instructions. 4 This
practice, using the burden of proof instruction, the Holland
instruction, and a fully definitional reasonable doubt instruction, is consistent with the recognized policy under Holland
of providing maximum protection of an accused from potential jury speculation and conjecture, since the reasonable
doubt instruction is expanded to fulfill the function of the
cautionary instruction.
The alternative of expanding the reasonable doubt
instruction to replace the cautionary instruction is presently
unavailable in Wyoming, as Cosco clearly prevents any elaboration of the meaning of "reasonable doubt" in Wyoming
courts."5 The accused must look elsewhere for protection
against jury speculation.
31. Holland v. United States, supra note 5, at 129.
32. Id. at 140.
33. Vincze v. State, 86 Nev. 546, 472 P.2d 936, 937 (1970); State v. Wilkins,
215 Kan. 145, 528 P.2d 728, 737 (1974) ; State v. Murphy, 823 A.2d 561, 565
(R.I. 1974); State v. Jackson, 331 A.2d 361, 365 (Me. 1975).
34. See cases cited note 33 supra.
35. Cosco v. State, supra note 13.
36. Admittedly, the Wyoming court argues that the term "reasonable doubt"
serves without further explanation, to establish the standard so clearly
as to limit the potential for jury speculation. However, the fact that
numerous other jurisdictions require a definitional instruction in terms of
reasonable doubt in the effort to supplant the cautionary instruction would
appear to cast serious doubt as to this position.
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The second option under the Holland doctrine is to simply
hold that the Holland rationale as to the equality of direct
and circumstantial evidence in terms of probative value is
not inconsistent with the giving of the cautionary instruction
on circumstantial evidence. Under this practice, the court
would use four instructions: the burden of proof instruction,
the nondefinitional reasonable doubt instruction, the cautionary instruction on circumstantial evidence, and the
Holland instruction. This approach has been adopted in
California. 7
The practice of maintaining the cautionary instruction
after accepting the Holland rule has substantial appeal for
a jurisdiction that disallows a definitional reasonable doubt
instruction. Once the policy of protecting the accused from
speculation is accepted, the recognition of the need to warn
the jury against such speculation is not illogical. The difficulty focuses upon the issue of whether the Holland doctrine
is inconsistent with the cautionary instruction. Allowing
both instructions serves to stress the lack of distinction in
the probative value of direct and circumstanial evidence and
further serves to mitigate the fears of the Holland Court by
supplementing the reasonable doubt instruction with the
cautionary instruction. The experience of California furthers the position that the Holland doctrine and the cautionary instruction are not necessarily incompatible.
The practice of using the cautionary instruction in conjunction with the Holland instruction is, however, expressly
rejected in the Blakeley decision. The Wyoming court adopted
the view that the two instructions are inconsistent and precluded the use of the cautionary instruction. 8
37. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRIMINAL §,§ 2.00-2.01 (1970). The instructions appear to sanction an instruction similar to the federal instruction discussed 8upra note 17, in conjunction with a cautionary instruction
that is indistinguishable from the Wyoming circumstantial evidence
instruction.
38. Blakeley v. State, supra note 7, at 863. The concurring opinion argues that
the cautionary instruction is inconsistent with the Cosco limitation on
reasonable doubt instructions, thus sacrificing the policy of protecting the
accused from jury speculation from the outset. Blakeley v. State, supra
note 7, at 864 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Wyoming is precluded from either alternative that is
open to jurisdictions adopting the Holland rule. The course
to be followed in the post-Blakeley era is clear: the Wyoming
court has sanctioned the Holland instruction at the sacrifice
of both the cautionary instruction regarding circumstantial
evidence and a definitional instruction regarding the reasonable doubt standard. The result is that the Wyoming trial
courts must give only the Holland instruction, the burden of
proof instruction, and the nondefinitional reasonable doubt
instruction. In effect, the Holland instruction must stand
alone, unaided by the cautionary instruction or the definitional reasonable doubt instruction."
PosT-Blakeley PROTECTION AGAINST SPECULATION

The impact of Blakeley follows as a matter of course
from the position taken by the Wyoming court in terms of
instructing on circumstantial evidence. The Wyoming court
rejected the view that express instructions are needed to
protect the defendant from jury speculation and conjecture.
Wyoming has joined a procession of jurisdictions in expressly
recognizing the equality of the probative values of direct and
circumstantial evidence. Blakeley, however, leaves little room
to doubt that the second policy consideration of protecting
the accused from speculation has been entrusted to the silence
of the reasonable doubt instruction.
The potential effect of entrusting the protection from
speculation and conjecture to an instruction that is silent on
the meaning of reasonable doubt is great. Certainly the jury
will no longer hear the court's admonition in terms of speculation. The potential of conviction on evidence that requires
a certain degree of speculation cannot be overlooked in the
post-Blakeley era. The Wyoming court expresses the thought
that Blakeley does not alter the standard of appellate review
in criminal cases.4" It is submitted that the reasonable doubt
instruction presently utilized in the state and the standard
39. Id. at 863.
40. Id.
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of review defined in Harris v. State'1 are insufficient to
foreclose the potential for conviction upon evidence that
would not have convicted before Blakeley.
CONCLUSION

Although circumstantial evidence has long been recognized as a necessary and valuable tool in obtaining criminal
convictions, the courts have also recognized the need to protect a criminally accused from jury speculation. Holland
indicates the need to equate the probative value of circumstantial evidence with that of direct evidence. Courts adopting Holland have generally expressed concern as to the unrestricted application of the rule and to that end have adopted
safeguard instructions to protect the accused.
The Wyoming court adopted Holland without hearing
arguments as to the desirability of adopting the rule or as
to adequate safeguards that should accompany its adoption.
Blakeley represents the Wyoming court's adoption of Holland
without provision for safeguards expressly approved by the
United States Supreme Court. The decision represents a
major departure from traditional Wyoming practice regarding circumstantial evidence. The controls on jury speculation and conjecture that had previously been utilized in Wyoming have largely been abrogated in the Blakeley decision.
The Cosco reasonable doubt instruction and the Harrisstandard of appellate review are the sole safeguards available to
a criminally accused whose conviction rests substantially on
circumstantial evidence. The adoption of Holland in other
jurisdictions indicates that these safeguards are insufficient
to accommodate the interests of the accused under the Holland
decision.
W. MICHAEL KLEPPINGER
41. 487 P.2d 800, 801 (Wyo. 1971). The standard given by the Wyoming court
is as follows:
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict
of guilty an appellate court will not weigh conflicting evidence
nor consider the credibility of the witness; and it must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
questions of law as to whether there is substantial evidence, direct
or circumstantial, or both, which, with the reasonable inferences
that may be drawn therefrom, will sustain the verdict.
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